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Abstract 
One of the core objectives of modern states is to set up a powerful, efficient higher 
educational system. In Serbia, progressive laws on higher education have long been in 
demand, but not in place: the inherited education system was the most incapable 
instrument for generating and transferring knowledge. Against this background, the 
Ministry of Education set its own goals for reforming the system, and in early 2003, 
offered a Bologna-tailored Draft Law on reforming higher education. Although passed 
through parliament in 2005, the new Acts did not definitely solve the legal status 
dilemma, the problem of autonomy entitlement and the relations between financing 
and steering of the educational system. In Serbia the position of the various 
stakeholders is unstable which poses a serious obstacle to Serbia’s adoption of the 
Bologna Declaration, which, the author believes, represents Serbia’s shortest path for 
escaping parochialism and achieving a knowledge-based economy with attendant 
GDP growth. After examining the aforementioned obstacle in further detail, a list of key 
incentives concerning the realisation of the Bologna ideas is offered, in addition to 
policy recommendations for decision makers and lawmakers involved in this process 
which has a crucial bearing on Serbia’s future. 
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1 Introduction 
In a clash between the social and legal orders the priority should be given to the social 
dimension. As evidence for the veracity of this preference, one has the following: at the 
beginning of 2001 (when the last fundamental political succession in Serbia had occurred) 
the inherited education system was the most non-capable instrument for the generating 
and transferal of knowledge. Against this background, the Ministry of Education set its 
own goals, aimed at reforming the system. In early 2003, the Ministry made and offered a 
Bologna-tailored Draft Law on reforming higher education. That Draft Law, to which I 
have contributed ex offo, was neither the best, nor the worst when assessed in a 
comparative prospective. However, frictions among stakeholders started from the first 
moment this Draft text appeared in public. Even before this time, someone decided to 
spread false information on the content of the act to the press, provoking fury amongst 
some of the stakeholders and/or confusion. Given this, the former Ministry of Education 
and Government did not have a chance to put this Act on the agenda of the Assembly. 
 Only two years later the new parliamentary majority passed the University Act, which 
incorporated roughly 85 per cent of the ideas, and even the text of the 2003 Draft Law. 
They did this without serious trouble. The main features of both acts were the introduction 
of a three-tier system of studying (PhD being the third one), together with ECTS as a 
measure of a student’s workload, of accreditation and evaluation procedures, as well as 
the slow inclusion of students as partners in governing processes. At the same time, both 
Acts were not able to clearly solve the legal status dilemma, the problem of autonomy 
entitlement and the relations between financing of and steering the educational system. 
Given all this, one may conclude that both Acts represent only a partial step toward 
Bologna - and that the second fails to clearly introduce any notable movement towards 
Europe. 
Taking into account the similarities in the contents of these Acts, a dilemma arises: is 
the recent and unexpected “maturing” of Serbian society a consequence of tiredness of 
the main opponents, or a real shift in the latter’s educational policy, brought about by 
argument and finally resulting in Parliamentary voting? 
Apart from this dilemma, the undisputable conclusion must be that, in 2003, the 
“Bologna” reform opponents were ready to block every modernization – while in 2005 
they were not. It is clear that the 2003 government had no, or at least insufficient allies to 
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support any idea of modernization; the Serbian state, at that time, lacked consensus for 
the necessary changes regarding universities. Even today, more than three years later, I 
– the author – am able to recall that sense of loneliness. 
These depressing circumstances have prompted my attempt now to prepare, in 
advance, the environment, milieu and atmosphere for the missed second semi-step, 
which consists of finding the final solution to the legal status problem – for legal capacity 
has to be vested in universities, redefining relations between founders/organizers and 
institutions, solving bank account issues, introducing flexible financing regulations, via a 
passing of the universities` and faculties Charter Acts. For further modernization of the 
education sector, it is necessary to persuade the majority of national stakeholders to 
whole-heartedly accept the solutions coming out of the international and European 
education order. I am convinced that Serbia’s best means of evading and escaping 
parochialism and achieving a knowledge-based economy with attendant GDP growth lies 
in the country’s urgent joining of the Bologna Club. This paper is my contribution to such 
a procedure. 
2 Flash Illumination 
2.1 The Main European Higher Education Problems of Today 
Seven years ago, in June, 1999, EU ministers of education signed the Bologna 
declaration and, therefore, established a new European Higher Education Area – EHEA. 
This represented the European attempt to trace a path from Humboldt’s university of the 
past to a more market-oriented higher education system of the 21st century.1 At least 
three very rational and pragmatic reasons pushed EU Governments towards the Bologna 
Declaration of 1999. 
First, it is undisputable that Europe created modern universities in past centuries. 
However, since the middle of the last century Europe has progressively surrendered its 
lead in higher education to the United States2. 
                                            
1
 See: “The best is yet to come”, A Survey of Higher Education, The Economist, September 2005, p. 20 
(hereinafter: ‘The Economist’). 
2
 The Economist, p. 6. The outcome is that, based on some measurable points, objective criteria, it is 
established that among top 20 world universities only 2 belongs to Europe region - University of Cambridge 
– bronze medal; University of Oxford - 8
th
 place
2
. All the rest, but one (University of Tokyo) belongs to 
United States. To put it differently - US today hosts 17 of the world top 20 universities. 
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Second, it is evident that 80% of European pharmaceutical research money, for 
example, goes to American research institutions instead of staying in countries of origin. 
Third, as Europe’s only chance of preserving its living standard lies in the 
knowledge-based economy, rather than in people working harder or more cheaply than 
overseas competitors, the biggest barrier to developing this kind of economy is 
inefficiency in its higher education systems and policies. 
Via the Bologna declaration, Europe has tried to find answers to the main challenges 
to higher education in the new era: via its democratization (higher educational aspirations 
had by a young population), its globalization (the ending of distances, a beardless world) 
and its increasingly competitive nature (as with sport, universities form a super-league of 
top class world universities competing for talents and prestige). 
The introduction of the Bologna declaration caused, all over the continent, a 
thunderstorm of change, so fundamental that the very idea of university became 
challenged. In a moment, this upheaval immediately united all opponents, who were 
ready to block every form of education modernization, in one united front, and gathered 
under the dictum “The best way forwards is backwards”. 
2.2 Additional Problems for South Eastern Europe and Serbia 
When compared with the old ‘core’ of EU countries, higher education in the rest of 
Europe shares the same deficiencies and, at the same time, has some additional 
drawbacks. These additional negative aspects are: 
• A long-lasting state monopoly in higher education combined with state control of 
such institutions; 
• Low levels of state’s budget investments as the sole or the most prevailing money 
source; 
• Neglecting development functions; 
• The immobility of students and teaching staff; 
• The practical inapplicability of academic programs, and lack of a multidisciplinary 
approach; 
• Long-lasting educational and, even, the scientific isolation of some states (Serbia). 
Less than 5 years remain until 2010. In 2003 and 2005, the Serbian starting position 
was very unfavorable: we were among the last members of the family of European states 
who had begun changes. The process itself is time-consuming, and our time is expiring. 
If we agree that European higher education is being forced to move along the long 
path between Humboldt-type universities and the more market-oriented higher education 
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system of 21st century, then it is obvious that there is an even longer path for east 
European countries. Some of them will indeed have to run. 
3 Stakeholders and the University Act 
Stakeholder recognition of the need for change as well as consensus concerning the 
essential elements of such changes is, for every government, the first step towards 
change. 
The position of stakeholders in Serbia is not stable - and varies in consequence of 
external influences and internal interests. Within this framework, in the next few pages I 
will briefly try to lay out the current positions of the main stakeholders with regard to the 
new higher education Act in Serbia. 
The following assessments are based on long-lasting personal experience of Serbian 
education and politics, published announcements and the proclamations of institutions, 
professional bodies, organizations and some political entities, as well as on feedback 
from a questionnaire distributed to professional and administrative bodies of the states 
formed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Hopefully, a defining of the full social 
milieu will lead to better understanding of the Serbian social scene and of implementation 
patterns for the new Act. 
All stakeholders can be divided between those who mostly support and those who 
mostly oppose educational reforms. This division is frequently based on public 
announcement of one’s attitude (which does not always match a person’s actual attitude 
however). Understandably, one has to take the former into account. The role and 
influence of each stakeholder differs; so some among them (those with relatively low 
influence) will be left out of any further elaboration. 
Opponents 
• State Universities and Faculties 
• Prevailing number of teaching (academic) staff 
• Unions 
• Prevailing number of political parties 
• Some Media 
• Church 
• “Intellectual Elite” – opinion Makers, predominantly 
Supporters 
• Government (Major actors: Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, 
• Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Science) 
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• Assembly (Parliament) 
• Private Higher Education Institutions 
• Students 
• Domestic and International Non-Governmental Organizations 
• Some Media 
4 The Position of Main Stakeholders 
4.1 Government and Parliament (Assembly) 
Serbia is led by a minority Government (Cabinet), one officially supported in 
Parliament by the unreformed Milosevic’s Socialistic Party of Serbia (SPS). That minority 
coalition consists of the conservative Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS – leading partner), 
the more European-oriented G17+ party, the conservative and traditional Serbian 
Renewal Movement (SPO) and the conservative-populist New Serbia (NS). While they 
are ready to harmonize the Serbian legal system with that of the EU, they are not ready to, 
capable of or willing to work towards bringing European values (ethical or other) into 
Serbia – which one could consider the main flaw of the minority Cabinet. 
At this moment, one of the most conservative parties among them, the DSS, is in 
charge of the Serbian education system. Contrary to their politically-driven public 
announcements, they are not wholehearted supporters of changes in the domestic 
education system, owing to their high regard for the country’s educational system. They 
also like to perceive themselves as being very valuable - and as a ‘spotless’ political party, 
they like to see themselves as self-sufficient. Given this, the only influences they might 
tolerate and accept are ones coming from the international community. Lastly, it would 
seem that they are in some kind of a coalition, at least on educational issues, with the 
conservative Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Nevertheless, in spite off the above, this party deserves all commendation when it 
comes to adoption of the new University Act. After they had seen the urgent need that 
existed to adopt this Act, they influenced all other coalitions partners, (save for G17+, 
who had supported the Act from the beginning). Yet it will take additional pressure on 
DSS to initiate further modernization and reform, given the fact that their support for the 
Act’s adoption was not motivated by their own views on the process or issues at stake. 
On the other side, the majority of members of Parliament have the same political 
options as the Governmental coalition supported by SPS. The opposition is divided 
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between the demagogic and reactionary Serbian Radical Party (SRS), probably the 
strongest Serbian political party nowadays (led by The Hague captive populist Vojislav 
Seselj) and the European-oriented Democratic Party, which is the second biggest 
political party in Serbia. 
The composition of the Government reflects the state of affairs of the main 
representative body, i.e. so conservatism and traditionalism prevail in Parliament. No 
influence or argument is possible at the level of Parliament therefore - it is much easier to 
perform at the level of Government. Changes in the position of government will swiftly 
sway the positions of the bulk of deputies. 
Yet there is a slight chance of persuading some parliamentarian bodies by involving 
them in inter-parliamentarian meetings and exchange programs – and this is particularly 
true when it comes to the usually unsteady and indecisive Education Committee. 
4.2 State Universities and Faculties 
Although Serbia does not have a higher education tradition at the level of, say, Italy or 
England3, the Serbian higher education tradition was established over one and half 
centuries ago. In 1838, the first Lyceum was founded, an event widely accepted as being 
the founding moment for Serbian university education. At first, the situation in Serbia was 
like in other countries. They were no huge differences between Serbian and other world 
education institutions either in terms of structure or regarding relations between parts and 
the whole. Universities in Serbia were integrated, faculties were really associated with 
the universities, and legal personality was attached only to Universities. 
In contrast with the case of other communist countries, the former communists in the 
FR Yugoslavia chose a different path via which to attain the same political goal of party 
control over higher education institutions. While centralization was the controlling pattern 
and a prerequisite was vertical influencing in other countries, our government chose 
“divide et impera” as a more sophisticated form of political control. 
In accordance with this dictum, at the beginning of the early 1950s the unity of the 
universities that had existed up to that point was broken by the 1954 Act.4  Following this, 
                                            
3
 Bologna - more than 9 centuries (established 1088), not much younger are Oxford (1096), Cambridge, 
and Prague. 
4
 See below. See, also, more on the historical background: Turajlic and others, Visoko obrazovanje u Srbiji, 
Reforma i Prednacrt zakona, AAOM, Beograd, 2004, p. 25. Petrovic, Jovancevic, Development of 
universities after Second Word War, in The Belgrade University 1838-1988, Belgrade, 1988, page 303.  
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a process of dis-integration5 commenced. With the enactment of the 1954 law, the core 
higher education role was transferred from the universities themselves to the faculties 
within Universities. In accordance with this Act, faculties became vigorous institutions, 
legally and financially self-sufficient, with legal status and bank accounts, and having the 
ability to earn and distribute (spend) money. A direct link between the state budget and 
each faculty’s bank account was established, to the total exclusion of the universities, 
even indirectly, from faculties` financing procedures. So universities became empty 
shells, a simple association of faculties without any clear function or mandate, a weak 
conglomeration, having no independent revenue sources. Afterwards, they lost their 
self-maintaining abilities too, and became financially dependent on the state and the 
faculties. Compared with a state-based organization, therefore, the newly constructed 
university edifice can be likened to a very weak confederation.6 
As networking among faculties ceased, one might conclude that, now, there are as 
many universities in Serbia as there are faculties. Each faculty is (more or less) a 
university per se. These faculties regard their self-sufficient and self-managing positions 
as their right, and they see every attack as an outright violation of what they perceive as 
their ‘autonomy’. However, the Bologna movement began a reintegration process among 
faculties in Serbia that has laid the ground for recent clashes, which were allegedly 
ideological, but which were actually financial. 
• First, in the states formed on former Yugoslav territory, with one exception 
(Slovenia), there is evidence that autonomy does belong to faculties rather than to 
universities7. Shifting autonomy to the university level, via the Bologna Declaration 
is, to some extent, an attack on the acquired rights of faculties therefore (as well as 
on the acquired rights of their academic staff), so represents a good reason to 
oppose reintegration. 
• Second, since almost all former reforms had been politically imposed and 
managed by the former state structures, state universities and faculties today bear 
more grudges than gratitude toward the state. Accordingly, they will endeavor to 
protect themselves from the future reach of state competencies, and they do so 
through stonewalling – using the notion of ‘autonomy’ and exaggerating the 
perceived scope of such autonomy. The real objective of such a statement is to 
                                            
5
 The same feature is underline, also, in Croatian literature. See: First Steeps in Bologna Proces, University 
of Zagreb, Zagreb, 2005, p. 11-12.  
6
 In Serbian literature Novak, Key Misconceptions Disrupting the Reform of Higher Education in Serbia, has 
used the same expression in Collection of Articles “Higher Education in Serbia on the Road to Europe: Four 
Years Later, Belgrade, 2005, p. 295. 
7
 . For example, according to law regulations in these countries it is evident that the students enroll 
themselves on the specific faculty, not on the university as a whole (entity) and that staff sign labor 
contracts with deans of the faculties, not with the universities` rectors In Croatia this situation will 
terminated 2007, due to the fact that in that year faculties will lose their legal entity status. (Almost all 
counties in our surroundings accepted Higher Education Acts according to which legal entity status 
belongs to universities (Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Hungary etc.)).    
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stress the abnormally large degree of self-dependency which is not accompanied 
by responsibility - something that is inherent in the ‘the autonomy of the faculties’ 
idea and also in their present behavior. 
• At the same time, bearing in mind past mistakes, the government is hesitating to 
define autonomy in a clear manner or in laying out suitable measures for interaction. 
Both actors are indecisive and frightened - indeed almost paralyzed because of the 
possible political and social fallout of their decision-making. 
• Third, and most importantly, the loss of faculties’ legal and financial independency 
and bank accounts is the real core of resistance to “Bologna”. And this “reverse side 
of autonomy” deserves a deeper look... 
While, on average, the share of state grants in the total revenue of the Serbian 
universities is around 50%, some faculties are able to earn a higher amount of own 
revenues (mainly based on tuition fees but, also, on research projects or consulting 
services). The salaries at these faculties are 3.5 times higher (or more) than the salaries 
at faculties where the self-contributed share of revenues is around 25%. There are very 
few faculties having such ability to supplement their budget with substantial amounts of 
self-generated revenue. Among them are the Law Schools, the Schools of Economics 
and the School of Medicine, influential faculties with lasting traditions and social prestige. 
Furthermore, teaching staff engaged in those “wealthy” faculties formed powerful 
interest groups in favour of the status quo and against the “Bologna” reforms. Their most 
frequent remark is that the supporters of the Bologna reforms are ‘setting a trap for 
themselves’. At the root of this “wisdom” lies a fear of reintegration, followed by a loss of 
economic independence, a unification of salaries at State University level and, as a 
particular and delicate consequence, and ending of the period when salaries were 
abnormally high. The position of such a stakeholder is thus honest and understandable. 
The conclusion to be drawn here, therefore, is that although universities and faculties 
share the main role and are the main participants in change, their positions do differ. 
Reintegration will turn universities into ‘reform winners’ - and we would expect them to 
be likely allies of Bologna reforms, although this is not being experienced with the 
2001-2004 Serbian government. Now, universities are very weak institutions, are 
disorganized, and have a large number of hired (and among these, mainly administrative) 
staff. The influence of universities is thus limited, with few recognizing them as genuine 
actors on the social scene; and the position of these weak institutions to a great extent 
depends on the Rector’s attitude and his ‘authority’ among intellectuals. 
Some of the wealthy faculties will be losers - though some of the poorer faculties will 
gain from reintegration. Faculties who have the capacity to increase their own revenues 
will always oppose the Bologna movement, and vice versa. Well-organized and 
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vociferous opponents always have contacts with journalists, being ready to produce and 
spread ideological tales dressed in traditional ‘clothes’. 
In such an environment, it might be more productive to present to teaching staff 
engaged in “underprivileged” state schools a clear outline of future benefits (for them) 
arising from the redistribution of salaries that will come via reintegration. This may be 
more effective than trying to sway “wealthy” opponents to accept potential pay cuts with 
“quality” and “demand and supply” arguments. It is normal to expect that, after some 
explanation, the prevailing number of faculties will support such changes – and only 
people’s fears (see below) might exclude them from the being on the supporting side of 
the story. 
4.3 Private Higher Education Institutions 
Free competition between high quality educational institutions is one of the 
paramount objectives of the Bologna movement. This is why evaluation, accreditation 
and licensing are immanent within the recent reforms. The real Bologna combat zone 
boils down to the following: 
Should all institutions be exposed to accreditation (or licensing)? In other words, 
should the newly established private universities be treated in the same way as those 
with exceptional, long-lasting traditions, and which are considered to be high-quality state 
institutions? 
While state universities possessed all the educational assets and best human 
resources for more than the last half-century, the establishment of private educational 
institutions picked up pace only in the last few years. The lack of human and money 
resources on the domestic market and the inexperience of founders and staff in 
educational matters often resulted in the creation of institutions of below-par quality. If 
one also adds the non-controversial observation that some of these institutions hold a 
business-like approach to the question of issuing and acquiring of diplomas, it becomes 
obvious why they are underrated - even in the minds of objective observers. These 
schools, in fact, need more time for development, but, even now, as shy, silent outsiders, 
they are more likely to be allies to educational reform. 
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4.4 Teaching (Academic) Staff 
Research, classifications, suspicions and evaluations pertain to the world of science. 
As sciences and teaching are two sides of the same coin, then, it is obvious that a good 
number of professors are well-educated as regards the scientific profession and in 
contemplation as well as in instruction provision. In addition, as self-evaluation is a 
dimension of evaluation, it is also clear that they are familiar with notions of 
self-evaluation and self-criticism. 
After accomplishing the self-evaluation procedure, some became conscious of the 
fact that they perhaps do not have all the required conditions that should go with a 
modern, well-skilled and competitive professor; and as internal and external evaluation 
represents a part of the Bologna reforms, it will be easy to ‘blame’ such reforms for one’s 
own failures. Two implied consequences (on a psychological level) of accomplished 
self-evaluation caused by the transparency of Bologna process may thus be: 
• a fear of incompetence 
• a fear of non-acknowledgement. 
These fears challenge one’s respectability and reputation, and both major aspects in 
the professional status of professors - so a loss of such factors will lead to a loss of status. 
Such professors shape the Bologna opposition, therefore – and they hide behind the 
magic notion of tradition in order to escape competition and/or further external 
evaluations. So frightened academic staff would prefer to hide rather than face reality - 
and try to find the way out. It will be possible for persons to suggest leaving out the 
evaluation test for all teaching staff older than, say, 50. This goes far enough - and will 
lead to a lowering of the number of losers and Bologna opponents. (See below: “Fears, or 
the Second Appearance of Tradition”). 
4.5 Political parties 
As education is a top priority in any society, all political parties’ possess their own 
education programs, and they try to implement them in reality. Yet the reality is that the 
Bologna reforms are not home-made - they are imposed from outside. This provides 
suitable ground for a “conspiracy theory”, something that is welcome and acceptable to 
the majority of Serbian political parties and (even) the ruling elite. The theory stems from 
a perception that, historically, Serbia has been at the receiving end of events. And this 
prompts another extremist conclusion: as the ‘outside world’ does not like us, we have to 
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be the world’s outsiders. Recent experiences of isolation and bombing reinforce such a 
perception8. 
External forms of the conspiracy theory’s façade may be visible in the one of following 
attitudes: 
• A growing resistance towards globalization. Despite the fact that the city of 
Bologna belongs to Italy and Europe, the Bologna process is perceived as an 
extension of American-led globalization. The majority of Serbian political parties are 
ready to equalize and confuse Bologna demands with what they perceive to be the 
main attributes of the American higher education system - in spite of the fact that 
they have limited knowledge and no experience of the American system. They see 
the Bologna movement as a European and Serbian move towards America, it being 
their contribution to the process of further globalization. As the battle against 
globalization is excellent ground on which to prove one’s own patriotism (the final 
message they pass to the electoral body is “we are the guardians of Serbian 
patriotism”), they turn to the self-styled ‘tribunes’. 
• There is a struggle to preserve elitist, traditional values in higher education - which 
might be destroyed by the Bologna process. Politicians frequently refer to the fact 
that Serbs are very proud of their history and traditions – and if someone proclaims 
any value traditional and admirable Serbs are ready, without much consideration, to 
protect such things. 
• The protection of Serbian culture as a whole - including universities, as pillars of 
this culture – is important, and it could be destroyed by the Bologna process. This 
objection rests on the same set of ‘arguments’ as previously mentioned. 
 As Serbian political parties are more nationally- than academically-oriented 
(admittedly, this is a trait shared by almost all political parties, worldwide) it is noticeable 
that there is much confusion among them; indeed, so much that they will have trouble 
                                            
8
 Prior to the changes of the 5
th
 of October and during the previous ten years, citizens of Serbia were 
dissatisfied with the status of their country in the international community and the treatment in was getting. 
This dissatisfaction grew into a negative attitude to the international community as a whole. The fact that 
the UN was resolute concerning the membership of Serbia in international bodies after the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, and the fact that Badanter (his commission) and the international community concluded that 
what took place in Yugoslavia was a dissolution, rather than a secession of individual republics, provoked 
the belief in an international conspiracy with the ultimate aim of destroying Serbia (and, at the time, 
Montenegro along with it). Any expression of sympathy coming from individual states (above all Greece, 
Russia, and China) then seemed immense and remained in popular memory.  
Immediately after the democratic changes, as a result of the quick accession to international institutions 
and the withdrawal of sanctions, the attitude turned to a temporary satisfaction of the majority with the 
international position of Serbia, but discontent quickly prevailed again. The reasons are both rational and 
irrational. They originate in the concept of sovereignty and its distortion – the belief that the international 
community interferes with internal Serbian affairs too much, that it dictates the terms of behavior, which is 
considered as interfering into our business, and not as a desire of the international community to meet the 
standards that would lead Serbia closer to integration (primarily into the EU). On the other hand, prevalent 
is the view that the international community is not doing enough to help resolve the economic problems of 
the country through donations (there is still an implicit belief in the duty to donate funds because of the 
bombing) and investment (Serbian firms are not understood as uncompetitive and the incompleteness of 
the legal norms that would attract investment is not comprehended). Finally, the fact that Serbia is still 
“blacklisted” in terms of the visa regime increases discontent even among those who successfully avoid the 
mentioned misperceptions.  
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distinguishing between the points laid out above. It seems that all parties have made use 
of these arguments, and in a confusing mixture, as a shield for one’s protection, and with 
no clear understanding of the significance and implication of the terms. The “conspiracy” 
‘defence’ is thus more destructive (“We do not want this or that”) than constructive (“We 
want this or that”). Besides this, as a prevailing number of parties are conservative, 
populist and/or demagogic, their perception that the majority supports the status quo on 
education will automatically force them to oppose any changes. 
Thus, the formation of an ad hoc educational coalition among pro-reform parties 
should be of great significance. In the area of education, the leading progressive party is 
DS, being followed by G17+ and (probably) by a predisposed DSS and some prominent 
leaders of SPO. 
4.6 The Church 
With its growing influence and authority in Serbian society and with an increasing 
ambition to participate at all levels of education, the church has muscled its way into a 
position of being an important partner, and it has several educational ‘themes’. Yet there 
is with the church, fortunately, less of an interest in this level of education than in the 
primary and secondary ones. 
The Orthodox Church has the largest share of believers in Serbia. It represents the 
most conservative organization in society, so it seeks no or only limited change. After the 
Second Word War, it lost all influence in education, though - and all of their assets and 
possessions gradually deteriorated. This did not, however, concern the authorities. Now, 
however, the restoration and expansion of church capacities and resources, and the 
sharp increase in its popularity is coinciding with a growth in ambitions for the upper 
echelons of the clergy. Unfortunately, the church has often been a part of the problem 
rather than a solution. Other churches have similar ambitions as those of the Orthodox 
Church, and work in close collaboration, which is probably due to the fact that they are 
aware that their ambitions may be fulfilled only if they work in a coordinated manner. 
4.7 The “Intellectual Elite” (Opinion Makers) 
The so-called “intellectual elite” does not have any firm organization, any domicile 
(address, headquarters), bodies or official leaders. Due to its “amorphous structure”, it is 
not on the same organizational level with the other stakeholders therefore. Nevertheless, 
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and in spite of this, they do deserve a separate, equal (and perhaps more prominent, and 
certainly not less important) place. 
Although the state puts constraints on the elite and although the “spirit of the nation” 
limits their capacity, it goes without saying that the mission of this elite is not to mimic or 
solidify the existing order but, rather, is to enhance the state’s capacity and to contribute 
to the development of the “spirit of the nation”. The main weakness is that the majority of 
the Serbian elite is not ready to change, but wants to maintain their acquired rights by 
defending the status quo for as long as possible. It will accept change unwillingly, and 
only after considerable delay. Most are conservatives and traditionalists that are ‘resting 
on their laurels’. Additionally, they are extremely vociferous, and are ready to create and 
incite, via public opinion, resistance against all things new. Indeed, the history of the 
Serbian state has taught us that the phenomenon of ‘a bunch of vocal individuals’ can be 
observed at every major historical crossroads. 
One may, therefore, conclude that “although there existed some material 
prerequisites (elements of a market economy, the openness of the former Yugoslavia to 
the world) for transition and rapid Europeanisation, no such mental or psychological 
readiness was ever present in Serbia. This readiness was non-existent among general 
populace and, more significantly, among the elite.”9 Apart from the political leadership 
(Milošević and his team), the majority in the intellectual elite of that time represented the 
same ideas, coming via the Academy of Sciences, the Association of Writers of Serbia, 
as well as the Church. 
Fortunately, time is not on their side, even in a biological sense - and they will slowly 
have to leave the scene. They certainly see this as a problem, and as a new recruiting 
policy they have been ready to grant certain privileges to incoming fellows, like 
membership status at prestigious academic, scientific and other intellectual societies and 
clubs; we can thus argue that supply and demand also exists at an intellectual level!  
Some distance from this noisy majority is a silent, quite introverted European-oriented 
minority. They are often accused of committing treason’ against Serbia, and hesitate to 
speak up about issues, or to appear in the press and other media. This has thereby 
created an ideological cleavage between the representatives of the civic, modern option 
on one side - and those of the nationalist, traditionalist option on the other.10 And the 
                                            
9
 L. Perović (1994), The Flight from Modernization, in: N. Popov (ed.) The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma 
and Catharsis, Part I, Sam izdat B92, Belgrade 
10
 See: Z. Đ. Slavujević, Possible Directions of Restructuring on the Serbian Party Scene, (2003), In: Lj. 
Baćević et al: Value Changes and Transition in Serbia: A Look into the Future. Belgrade: Institute of Social 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES / INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06 
 17 
problem of redefining concepts and divisions into “patriots” and “traitors” remains, for 
such terms, used so often and so unreservedly within the political discourses of the past, 
have left a serious psychological burden - and indisputably have an effect on the main 
ideological divisions. 
4.8 Students 
It is telling, that my first intention was to exclude students from this list. For the reality 
is that, in spite of the fact that they may be observed as open-minded, progressive actors 
in the Bologna process, they are not in front line in any battle for reforms; yet if one adds 
that they usually get sympathetic coverage and support from the media it is obvious what 
powerful allies they could well be. 
However, for their entire lives the Serbian educational system has treated them as 
blindly obedient - which is, of course, absurd. Serbian law students are equally - or 
perhaps less - trained to obey rules (i.e. as equally as anybody else). Given this, their 
main interest is to get their diploma, disregarding the amount of knowledge received in 
the process. The system treats them as mere consumers in the education contract, via a 
contract to supply them with a “knowledge-giving” service. 
This incorrect and even immoral theory, frequently repeated during periods of 
education, shapes generations, who are thus prepared to follow rather than lead. This is 
why they do not feel so empowered to steer their own lives, and have even less willpower 
and strength to participate in a social and didactic movement. Yet they definitely deserve 
to see a reform of the whole educational system, as that is their only chance of reaching 
Europe. 
5 The Core Obstacles 
Thus, the “Bologna movement” is an unwelcome and uninvited innovation for the 
majority of stakeholders. In the next few pages, I will try to make an inventory of some of 
the major obstacles that are most often put forward by opposing stakeholders; while 
arguments that are pro the Bologna movement will be dealt with here as well. 
The most common arguments coming from prominent opponents (i.e. faculties, 
teaching staff and opinion makers) can be reduced to following statements: 
                                                                                                                                            
Sciences. 
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5.1 That Illusive Word – Tradition 
Half a century of disintegration of Serbian universities11 prevents us from supporting a 
movement that – as in “Bologna rules” - favors centralization and integration. 
As mentioned, the unity of universities in the former Yugoslavia was broken by the 
1954 Act. Further developments in Serbian higher education simply followed this 
mainstream move, based on the communist’s pragmatic approach towards resolving a 
burning political problem of university control. The advocates of this approach consider 
themselves to be exclusive owners and guardians of Serbian tradition, including 
university traditions. However, they completely disregard two very important preliminary 
questions: when did this history commence - and when did this particular tradition begin? 
Well-versed in communist ideology, they are always ready to connect the 
commencement of history with the commencement of the rule of the system they 
sympathized or belonged to. Evidence of the ‘veracity’ of this statement are contained in 
the following equation: if one takes 1838 as the year of the Serbian higher education 
system’s introduction, then our tradition extends to a period of 167 years. From this 
launching moment, up to 1954 - consequently 126 years - Serbian Universities have 
been integrated12. Therefore, in comparison with the previous time period, one may 
designate 1954 as the year when university policy began to go astray. Simple calculation 
shows that the integrating period lasted 126 years, and the disintegrating one 51 years13. 
So much for tradition therefore… 
In addition to these arguments, which are political and ideological in nature (and far 
from the political arena), though from the same school of thinking, arise two 
better-founded, more commonsense arguments regarding ‘integration non-capacities’ 
and ‘disintegration capacities’. The base for the first is the protection of acquired rights 
(hereafter, legalism), while the aim of second is a pragmatic, managing approach to the 
problem (hereafter, pragmatism). 
                                            
11
 One of the main pro-Bologna fighters in Serbia, Srbijanka Turajlic considers reintegration of Serbian 
universities as our most complex steep toward Europe. I agree with this opinion. See Turajlic, “Higher 
Education in Serbia between Tradition and Reality, in Collection of Articles “Higher Education in Serbia on 
the Road to Europe: Four Years Later, Belgrade, 2005, p. 290. 
12
 Conclusion extract from legal texts. Basic University Regulation, on September 16. 1939. (Art. 2, 3 and 9) 
points out those Universities had been legal persons. In addition, faculties, even, did not have bank’s 
accounts, but for a limited reasons (donations and legacy), and finally, dean of the faculty had been a part 
of university organization as university body.  
13
 In the same manner see Turajlic, “Higher Education in Serbia Between Tradition and Reality, in 
Collection of Articles “Higher Education in Serbia on the Road to Europe: Four Years Later, Belgrade, 2005, 
p. 289. 
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5.2 Legalism 
For the reintegration process sought after via “Bologna”, there has to be some 
encroachment on faculties’ ‘acquired rights’. In the eyes of conservatives, though, this 
also has a flipside. They rally around the claim that the “reintegration of universities, 
according to the “Bologna reforms” will lead to a loss of “financial independence”. Such 
an approach relies on the hypothesis that the autonomy of faculties (originating in the 
1954 Act) does give them an acquired right. 
If it is true that state’s faculties are institutions dependent upon the state budget, then 
it is peculiar that the financier (the State of Serbia) does not have more competence - and 
is even ready to abdicate from exercising any competencies. It looks as if the state is 
more inclined to accept a ‘bloated’ notion of autonomy than to define such a notion 
clearly. 
As all persons are very sensitive to acquired rights, whether they are private or public, 
it is very tricky for governments to challenge the vested rights of citizens and legal entities, 
especially if the government plans to win the next election. This ‘hazard’, having potential 
political repercussions, prevents governments from waging costly and prolonged 
legislative wars. Governments follow the course of the least resistance, and are usually 
not capable enough (at times not capable at all) of - or not strong enough to – balancing 
things up. The 1954 Act has to be considered as “peccatum originale”, an initial 
‘deviation’ moment - and the first violation of the system. Even if old injustices are not 
corrected by new ones, the rectifying of old mistakes undoubtedly has to occur by 
tackling the problem gradually, while keeping adverse effects to a minimum. Anyhow, the 
Serbian problem of legal subjectivity should not be allowed to jeopardize the movement 
as a whole (even in Serbia).  
The reverse side of the autonomy argument is financial. Given this, pro Bologna 
financial arguments are as follows (See also: State Universities and Faculties). 
The ability to increase the share of a faculty’s own revenues depends mostly on 
enrolment fees. As this is determined by the economic conditions of the state (where the 
sky is not the sole limit), the main base for increasing revenues remains the number of 
enrolled students. Thus, faculties calculate on having a large number of enrolled students, 
which inevitably leads to student body ‘inflation’. As the quality of studies and the quantity 
of students do not usually go hand in hand, increasing salaries will be (paradoxically) 
followed by reductions in quality (a lack of human resources, office space, support 
equipment, etc). Then comes diminishing enrollment… Aware of this cycle, Bologna 
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opponents are usually distinguished fighters against the private education sector and 
competition – even though it is more or less clear that free competition and private 
education are inevitable at the beginning of the XXI century. 
A simple question remains “Who, under such circumstances, will emerge as 
long-term losers - and who will win?” It is hard not to bet on the concept and practice of 
quality. 
Last but not least, if the conduct of teaching staff operating in “wealthy” schools is 
understandable, what about the behavior of individuals engaged in “underprivileged” 
faculties? Instead of turning themselves into well-organized promoters of the Bologna 
movement and clashing in an academic and intellectual sense with the opponents of 
Bologna, this group is reserved, even numb. This is surprising, given the fact that they 
almost certainly would be beneficiaries of a leveling of salaries at university level. One 
needs to stress that it might be more constructive to present a clear outlining of future 
benefits (for the latter persons) coming via a redistribution of salaries than to try to 
convince “wealthy” opponents to accept potential decreases in salary using “quality” and 
“demand and supply” arguments, however truthful such arguments are. 
Finally, if the law really wants to attract teaching staff from “wealthy” faculties onto the 
“Bologna” side, it can be done via simply resorting to economics. With this objective, the 
state need to be obliged to maintain, pro futuro”, the same level of budget investment for 
each individual faculty (salaries, stipends and maintenance); while, at the same time, 
faculties should retain the ability to ‘top themselves up’ from self-earned monies - thus, 
bank accounts at the level of faculty should be kept14.  
5.3 Pragmatism – Inability to Steer Massive Systems 
A lack of legal and other abilities (skilled staff, experience, organizing and 
infrastructure capacities) with which to guide gigantic universities is the next objection to 
Bologna. And this objection has most resonance when it comes to the situation of 
Belgrade University, which comprises 31 faculties - which then begs the question: is it 
politically or scientifically correct to base one’s criticisms on one exception? Nevertheless, 
                                            
14
 In Slovenia, universities received lump sum from the state budget for all members (institutions) and then 
distribute it to particular faculties. In Croatian, both entities (universities and faculties) received money 
separately and directly from state budget. Special rules for the University of Zagreb oblige faculties to 
contribute, from own incomes, in the University Developing Found 1-6% per year. In a year, 2006 Croatian 
budget will pass to lump sum methodology too. Serbia Higher Education Act does not contain any article 
concerning financing methodology. In all compared states both subjects’ posses bank accounts. All dates 
collected from the distributed Questionnaire. 
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as this University may be considered the nucleus for all other universities and, 
additionally, it represents one-half of the Serbian state higher education body, such a 
remark does deserve consideration. 
First, let us assess the claim that Belgrade University is the biggest, or almost the 
biggest, university in the world. Is this statement sustainable? A simple comparison of 
dates offers uncertain grounds on which to come to a conclusion - for the organization 
and structures of universities in other countries differ greatly here, and in many other 
respects; only the label “University” is commonplace. Constitutive elements of such 
organizations could also differ as regards other factors, too - for example, internal 
divisions into schools, faculties, departments, academic units, academic schools, etc. 
Consequently, comparing notions of “Universities” deserves a broader, comprehensive, 
almost academic investigation... At first glance it seems that Belgrade University is not so 
peculiar when we look at its size (31 faculties and 75000 students). In addition, one can 
investigate a number of other institutions of higher education, like the University of Rome 
(180 000 students), the National University of Mexico (200 000), Turkey’s Anodal 
University (530 000), the University of Berlin (100 000), Oxford University, England’s, and 
the University of Texas (more than 50 000 enrolled students, etc)15. 
One is thus able to see that size by itself is not a good reason to preclude the 
possibility of successful management.   
Nonetheless, if we admit that the handling of giant institutions is a complex task, there 
exist at least three ways out of this problem. 
• The first consists in initiating, within law, the capacity-building process16. This 
would entail the gradually-planned transfer of functions and competencies from 
faculties to universities along with the gradually-planned rebuilding of universities 
infrastructure capacities. In the short run, this process will increase expenditure 
(human capacity, new institutions etc.) though, in the long run, expenses could be 
cut. It is more rational, from an economic standpoint, to have only one University 
headquarters backed up by supporting institutions than 31 separate faculty 
headquarters. 
• A second way out presumes a legally-based, and final dis-integration of Belgrade 
University followed by a re-merger or the building of an association of related 
faculties/schools that would have reasons for merging together and rationalizing 
themselves. In this manner, in the zero hour, Belgrade University may be divided 
into several functionally operative smaller units, with these being newly-founded 
and integrated (smaller) universities. 
                                            
15
 For the complete information of word-wide universities situation see: http/univ.cc/word.php; In similar 
manner see Novak, Key Misconceptions Disrupting the Reform of Higher Education in Serbia, in Collection 
of Articles “Higher Education in Serbia on the Road to Europe: Four Years Later, Belgrade, 2005, p. 295. 
16
 Partially, in this manner Serbian legislator solved this problem in new Serbian Act. See: Higher Education 
Act, Off. Gazette SCG, no 76/05 September 2. 2005.   
ASO KNEZEVIC: SERBIAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 22 
• Nevertheless, if the main objection of these opponents consists of preserving the 
mere unity of the University of Belgrade, this may be achieved by constructing a 
‘compound system’ with two levels of organization. On the first level, the unique 
(singular) University should be divided into a couple of departments (via networking 
related faculties); and, at a secondary level, these departments should be spread 
out further (to faculties, into schools). And autonomy would be shared within the 
framework of the first organizational level. 
5.4 Fears (or: The Second Appearance of Tradition) 
The very notion of fear belongs to the twilight zone of irrationality - thus, there are no 
rational arguments to persuade one not to succumb to them. Because of this, it is less 
painful and more convenient to remain on the plane of tradition chosen by opponents of 
the Bologna process, using their surface arguments as shields - rather than to sink into 
an ocean of fears. 
If one aim of this paper is to identify and ameliorate arguments for changing the 
attitudes of the opponents of modernization, and to attract and involve the biggest 
potential number of subjects in the modernization process - then one of the reasons for 
such a change can be recognized in the subsequent argument: 
The entirety of tradition inherited in the moment of engaging with some institution 
represents a product of the preceding activities of our predecessors, and it forms a part of 
the past, just like baking a traditional chocolate cake! When one takes charge of a 
business one can chose between two possibilities: 
• The first consists of undertaking guardianship, and having a tradition-keeping 
function. In line with the metaphor used above, this is a kind of refrigerator for the 
chocolate cake. However, no matter how tasty the cake is, the refrigerator will 
always remain a machine. In my opinion, this engagement is not sufficiently 
interesting if we are looking at a lifelong engagement (considering the vanity and 
ambitions of teaching staff, and without any flattery). They are, in fact, ready for 
more than this. 
• As a result, Bologna promoters have to offer opponents a second choice, with a 
superior prestige level. The ‘cake of tradition’ is enormous, so one may make use of 
a refrigerator, but it also has to be consumed while fresh. And another cake will then 
be baked for the future... Teaching staff backgrounds, their positions and 
knowledge will enable them to change from being keepers of tradition into 
participants within a constant building process - into being the masons of future 
tradition. If they accept, then the position of participants will be equidistant from the 
position of opponents and promoters. 
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Additionally, a person that supports tradition, by definition, cannot be opposed to the 
principle of free competition. The exclusion of free competition is a burial place for quality, 
prosperity and, because of this, will present a barrier to up-and-coming tradition. 
6 Key Incentives 
From this standpoint one is able to see at least three categories of incentives 
concerning the realization of Bologna ideas. 
The first might be labeled ‘political’, by nature. Namely, the majority of prominent 
Serbian politicians point to (though perhaps only via paying lip service) European 
integration as their main political aim. This phenomenon is something that can be used! 
It is a long road between Serbia and the European Union. Serbia has to leave behind 
a number of tests and to adjust the bulk of its regulations before any accession process 
can begin in earnest. But, meanwhile, in some areas, progress could occur more rapidly. 
As a part of European Union, EHEA is our shortcut to this desirable space. We should 
note that: 
• Any government that contributes to European integration will gain an aura of 
prosperity. 
• The educating and raising of new generations of socially-responsible intellectual 
and political elites on the basis on the new 2005 Act will contribute to the democratic 
course of development of the state and also support the process of transition and 
economic recovery. 
Second and third category of incentives would be combining the academic and 
financial elements of schooling. The existing state Serbian higher education system is 
notoriously inefficient. Only 11% students’ graduate on time! In addition, a mere 30% of 
the total number of enrolled students graduate at all. The average duration of 
undergraduate studies is 7.5 years - which is a significant drain on the Serbian budget. 
Additionally, huge Serbian state universities are networking, while superfluous numbers 
of faculties (e.g. four state law schools) puts a further strain on state financing. 
•  By limiting exam possibilities, “Bologna” will motivate students to become more 
rational, directed and to finish their studies in a shorter time period17. 
• It is more than obvious that the battle for quality and transparency (both inherent in 
the Bologna process and in the 2005 Act) could lead to a prevention of both 
                                            
17
 According to the experience of University of Montenegro, when properly implemented new system leads 
to increase of passing grades and decreasing in a number of years spent studying; see Kostic, The 
Bologna process at the University Montenegro Faculty of Law – Bitter Sweet Experience, pp 1-2; Belgrade 
International Seminar.  
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“Achilles’ heels” involved in the process of transition: that is, the brain drain (“I’ll 
leave my home country”) and unfair competition coming from a low-level private 
sector (with the elimination of more inferior institutions, irrespective of who their 
founder/organizer is). 
• The outcome of “Bologna” will be rationalization of a network of higher education 
institutions via implementation of a quality insurance test. 
• Reintegration of faculties will lead to a reduction in costs and expenses, because of 
a decline in the number of supporting institutions and headquarters. 
• This transformation towards integration will lessen the need for teaching staff, 
which fits in with objective limitations existing in connection with the amount of 
human capital in Serbia. 
• There will be mutual recognition of diplomas (Lisbon Convention), which fact will 
facilitate all kinds of integration (science, on the labor market, educational), which 
will in turn point towards a United Europe. 
7 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
It is more than obvious that Serbian higher education today desperately needs 
modernization. External circumstances favor this direction, for Europe is at present also 
conscious of the need for higher education change, and the greatest number of 
European university centers is reform-oriented. So the external background and the 
milieu exist18. If we admit our deficiencies, this moment might prove to be the most 
convenient one when it comes to self-reforming, as it is much easier to change the 
system together (and in cooperation) with others than to do it while relying solely on one’s 
own resources and ‘expertise’. The European reform movement is growing - and we are 
a natural partner. 
As the Bologna movement has opened the door to reforming processes, it would be 
useful for Serbian academics and politicians to identify the main aims of such reform and 
to look at the tools with which one might achieve such aims. In my opinion, the identifying 
of future objectives, and the tools for attaining these objectives are of paramount 
importance with regard to state higher education in Serbia 
 
Goals Tools 
A quality level of education and 
quality assurance that is as high 
• Permanent evaluation 
• Accreditation and licensing 
                                            
18
 According to “The Economist” this is happening for four mean reasons: massification (democratization) 
of education, knowledge-based economy, globalization and competition. See The Economist, The brains 
business, A survey of higher education, September 10 2005, p. 3.  
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as possible • Transparency of the education process 
• Support for exchange teaching-staff and 
student programs.  
Attractiveness of the local 
educational system 
• Establishing relevant, flexible, modern 
curricula, especially multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary 
• Harmonization of the education system with 
European tendencies 
Rationalization of network  
• Licensing and accreditation of all 
institutions (already existing and newly 
founded), excluding some schools from the 
education process if they fail to fulfill 
prescribed conditions  
Efficiency of the system 
(Reduction of costs and 
expenses) 
• Integration of faculties as a prerequisite for 
reducing the number of supporting 
institutions and headquarters 
• Organizing improvements in the use of 
space, and supporting teaching equipment, 
labs and libraries 
• Reducing the number of teaching staff 
• Increasing the number of students
19
 
• Shortening duration of study 
• Giving, via regulation, possibilities to 
diversify income sources 
Competition possibilities  
• Equality of state and private higher 
education systems with regard to their 
establishment and quality ‘tests’ needing to 
be passed. 
• Competition for all participants in 
procedures (students, institutions, 
professors).  
 
My personal view is that additional efforts should be made to build up a conviction 
among the majority of stakeholders as regards the necessity of having change. In 
reaching of consensus among them, it would be desirable: 
                                            
19
 “Higher education is rapidly going the way of secondary education: it is becoming a universal aspiration” 
Statement found in The Economist, A survey of higher education, September 2005. In contemporary word 
democratization, massification is one of the main features of higher education.   
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• to organize (or co-organize) as much as is possible international conferences 
devoted to higher education issues; 
• to involve the most important stakeholders, additionally, in some kind of public 
debate, with the objective of getting peaceful conflict resolution; 
• to accept persons as partners with regard to common projects, while tolerating 
their (likely) initial professional ‘deficiencies’, and to support exchange programs 
that would serve to make persons more open-minded; 
• to insist, in every debate, on the fact that autonomy belongs to universities, not 
faculties - and to support those of them which insist on university re-integration 
processes for the sake of the sustainability of the system and the rationalizing of 
expenses; 
• to support all ideas aimed at preventing (further) political control of higher 
education institutions; and 
• to be aware of the fact that huge changes in states of minds will be time-consuming, 
so that one needs to be patient but also resolute when it comes to a desire to “save 
time”. 
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Appendix 
Guidelines for Lawmakers 
Clean-cut aims and plain wording will serve to make easy the drafting of the legal 
regulations. Legal wording, as a matter of approach and style, belongs to the sphere of 
the legal environment and to the background of a country – and will need advising on only 
to a limited extent. However, determination and selection of the main aims of any legal 
act, as a part of educational policy, will serve to reflect the broader social consensus and, 
therefore, may be liable to a greater degree to the personal input of advisors. 
Even those suggestions that are rejected in the drafting process will have impact – 
thus, there is no such thing as a useless suggestion. 
Predicament – single or double track (Is non-public higher education in Serbia 
equal or inferior to public – i.e. state – education?) 
The initial dilemma the Serbian legislator will face when setting up the structure of the 
act, boils down to the following question: “Should the same legal act be applicable to all 
higher education institutions, independently of their founders or investors?” This dilemma 
stems from present quality discrepancies between state and private education 
institutions, as seen. 
In my opinion, it is much better for the government to present a single set of high legal 
standards (the act) for both sectors (public and private) whilst retaining its ability to 
exclude from the higher educational network those institutions that do not comply with 
prescribed standards. Given that the most important objective of every government in the 
field of higher education has to be quality, this kind of proceeding should be taken 
exceedingly seriously for reaching that aim. Provisions applicable only to the public 
sector (if there are any, e.g. concerning state financing) will have to be especially 
denoted. 
At present, there are two possible approaches to the question of limiting the scope of 
act application: 
• Firstly, arising from a numerus clausus approach (enumeration), where all existing 
higher education institutions in the country should be listed, by their official name, 
as the institutions to which the act shall apply20. 
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 Art. 6 of Austrian Universities Act (2002) 
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• Secondly, the approach would be thus: that the Law has to match (via an 
equalizing effect), in a general manner, and also clearly, affecting both the private 
and public educational sectors21. 
For transition countries, the second approach is more appropriate because of the 
unsteadiness and changeable nature of the organizational network. 
Necessary content of the Higher Education Act 
The Ministry of Education in the proposed procedure and the Assembly in the 
law-making process are unrestricted in being able to determine the main components of 
an Education Act, including a Universities’ act. However, common agreement is that a 
couple of topics concerning universities are unavoidable as regards such a basic act. So 
it is desirable for these acts to cover following topics: 
• Definition of the notion of higher education - and determination of the types of 
higher education institutions 
• Determination of the purposes, principles and duties of universities 
• Foreseeing possible forms of founding, winding-up and merging of the institutions, 
and identification of potential founders from both public and private sectors, 
accompanied with accreditation terms and procedure 
• Definition of the notion of university autonomy and the autonomy of supplementary 
higher education institutions 
• Legal form – that is, the legal ‘entity’ (with their capacity) of various higher 
education institutions; along with acquisition and winding-up procedures 
• Basic principles for the giving and recognition of degrees (recognition of foreign 
diplomas) 
• University governance and internal structure 
• The financing of state universities and other institutions, financial and suitability for 
management, accounting and reporting 
• Financial and legal supervision; the financial responsibility of governing bodies 
• Accreditation and evaluation of such institutions 
• Academic freedoms 
• University fees and general provisions concerning remission and reimbursement of 
university fees, and other forms of students support 
• Commercial possibilities existing for state universities 
• General provisions concerning students, student admission procedures, 
organizing, and student bodies 
• General provisions regarding academic and administrative staff 
• Legal actions and dispute resolution22 
                                            
21
 In that manner: art. 1 of Albanian Higher Education Act. Similar, but not the same, is Art. 1 of new Serbian 
Act on Higher Education. In defining the scope of its application, it do not made any distinction, or 
discrimination between private and public sector, providing that it will be applied on the entire system of 
higher education.   
22
 See, Farrington, Governance in Higher education: Issues arising from the work of the Legislative reform 
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This list of topics is a basic one. Other concerns can be dealt with by associated acts, 
and via university charters and statutes. A few of the above-mentioned topics are, in the 
case of Serbia, especially sensitive. In our opinion, the most important questions of the 
kind dealing with autonomy, legal capacities, bank accounts, and quality as related to 
evaluation and accreditation. The next few pages of this study will be devoted to these 
issues. 
University autonomy 
From the legal standpoint, if we are near to saying that autonomy belongs to 
universities and not to faculties (or even elsewhere) the most effective way of defining 
such a thing is to define it clearly. This is the best that the law can do…  
In contemporary economic literature, among liberal economists, there is a 
widespread perception that there is a strong correlation between autonomy and financing 
issues (the origin of money). It appears, from writings, that there is a fine line between a 
moderate observation noting that “when universities depend on the taxpayer, their 
independency… suffers”, and an extreme one holding that “they (the universities) can be 
autonomous institutions, mainly dependent on private income … or they can be state 
financed and state-run”23. And second, it may suggest that the autonomy of universities 
contradicts the very notion of a model where higher education is financed by the 
taxpayer. 
In my opinion, equalizing autonomy with private money sources (fees, donations) and 
dependency upon public money sources (taxpaying) is somewhat exaggerated, though. 
To put it differently, independently of the origins of financing, the main problem of 
universities lies in the amount of actual money at their disposal and in 
organizers/founders’ concerns regarding governance and quality-related issues. An 
indifferent organizer is always a bad one, irrespective of its public (state) or private 
‘personality’ - and such indifference will be reflected in money contributions. While a 
wealthy state devoted to higher education and to a knowledge-based economy could 
represent itself as an organizer that is as accountable and admirable as any private 
donor. For the sake of education’s prosperity, it should be reasonable and desirable, for 
transitory states, to avoid the state’s monopoly, and to put private and public education 
                                                                                                                                            
Programme for Higher Education and Research of the Council of Europe, DECS/LRP (98) 28. 
23 See The Economist, “Who pays to study” and “Pay or decay”, January 22nd 2004.  
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on an equal footing so that free competition can take place between them. Special legal 
protection for public education is counterproductive, and it will lead to ruin. The only thing 
that separates good, mediocre and bad universities is the idea of firmness of 
commitment. 
The legal notion of university autonomy in Serbia, especially among academics, is 
often confused with the legal notion of state sovereignty. As said, from a Serbian point of 
view, the real problem is universities` deliberately erroneous reading of the notion of 
“university autonomy”, which results in exaggeration of the perceived range of such 
autonomy and the state’s (government’s) hesitation in defining clearly and with adequate 
authority such range. The latter is a reflection of the state’s implied yet also frank 
confession that education is not (yet) on the list of its top priorities. Also, such hesitation 
reflects Serbia’s unsettled budget situation. Yet the definition’s necessity remains. 
Definition 
As a compound notion, in our opinion, autonomy has the following dimensions: 
  
• Academic dimension: 
• Universities have the ability to determine and define of areas of teaching and scientific 
research, though teachers must observe regulations in force concerning educational 
and teaching arrangements. 
• Teaching shall be public, and access to teaching should be limited only for certain 
well-founded reasons. 
• Universities shall not be ‘directed’ regarding the academic content of their teaching or 
the content of research work. 
• Universities are entitled to recruit their own personnel/staff. 
• Universities are entitled to cooperate with the other domestic and foreign universities, 
associations and institutions, regarding exchange programs and other purposes, 
during teaching and scientific research and for staff training.  
• Managing dimensions: 
• Universities are entitled to elect their steering bodies and authorities. 
• Teaching staff/personal are entitled to elect to and to be elected for those bodies, in 
line with universities’ charters. 
• Financial dimension: 
• The government shall fund state universities. The budget of each university will be 
included as a separate item into an educational budget (pro futuro proposal). 
• Universities are entitled to offer/render services in the areas of teaching or scientific 
research, and to make money out of such provided services. 
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• Universities shall be free to use their incomes as they see fit, except insofar as the law 
stipulates otherwise. 
• Universities shall manage their financial affairs in their own name and regarding their 
own accounts.  
• Property dimension: 
• If universities have real property of their own accord, they may dispose of such 
properties with the consent of the relevant Ministry or according to general rules 
issued by the Ministry or Assembly. 
• The Ministry may issue rules concerning the renting and letting of real property.  
• Legal dimension: 
• During the preparation of acts and decrees solely concerning universities, the 
universities shall have the opportunity to issue statements on such matters.  
• Accompanying the state’s commitment: 
• The state guaranties the integrity of universities` institutions and territory. 
• State bodies (especially given their coercive abilities) may not intervene in the 
academic environment, except by request or by permission of the heads of 
universities or if there is a case of flagrant crime or of force majeure.  
 
It is to be suggested, and is desirable, that all of these dimensions of the given notion 
are integrated (incorporated) into a single Serbian legal definition, because of the existing 
open disputes that exist between the state and universities. 
The integrated university, legal entity (capacity), status and bank accounts 
Pedagogical (educational and academic) concerns and reasoning point towards a 
move to integrated universities: 
 
• There will be a greater intensity of inter-faculty collaboration opportunities, 
accompanied with facilitation of faculties networking 
• Increasing the mobility of students on the local, basic stage - and an increased ability 
to create own knowledge profiles 
• Joint curricula production (interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary ones) 
 
Major economic reasons also offer a rationale for integrated universities: 
 
• Decreasing the numbers of the teaching staff and raising levels of personal 
specialization 
• Full utilization of supporting equipment and space-saving (libraries, labs, computer 
labs, accountants` offices) 
• Reducing of the number and size of faculty headquarters 
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• Rationalizing the number of personnel (accountants, officials and other skilled and 
non-skilled supporting staff) 
• A general rationale: budget economizing  
 
It is almost impossible to find rational ground, save for personal selfish reasons, on 
which one might avoid faculties’ integration. Therefore, one can conclude that the future 
belongs to the integration of faculties into an integrated university system. 
Accordingly, the first suggestion concerning legal entity issues should be that legal 
capacity has to be vested in universities in their entirety (as they encompass all faculties) 
in accordance with the existing legal structure (which points to the proposed solution). It 
is also desirable to give - in order to dampen the initial shock and progression of the 
transition period, transitory norms, and for a period of three years a ‘sunset period’ to 
faculties as regards their current legal status, until the ending of their legally subjective 
nature occurs. 
At the same time, it would be desirable to separate and to set aside bank account 
issues from legal capacity dealings, and to tolerate the possession of some kind of bank 
sub-account for managing faculty’s financial affairs in their own name and for 
themselves. 
Finally, the Charter Act (Statute) should provide a way of steering giant universities 
(like that of Belgrade). 
Quality 
In the core of the any university development and success lies the notion of quality - 
or, to put it another way, medium and long-term quality is a university’s condictio sine qua 
non. 
Being the major feature of the higher education, quality avoids being grasped by legal 
definition, though it is still desirable to indicate and define it in a legal manner, i.e. the 
main pillars of such a notion, as measured by accreditation, evaluation and standards24. 
• Accreditation is to be understood as formal and final academic appraisal, an 
announced statement of whether a higher education institution and the courses it 
                                            
24
 In Serbian language see: Nikolić and Malbaša, Acreditaion in Serbian Higher Education“, Belgrade, 2002; 
Handal, Sudentş evaluation of teachins, Manual for teaching staff and students, Belgrade, 2003; 
Commission for Higher Education Accreditation, Instructions and Criteria for Evaluation and Accreditation, 
Belgrade, 2004, 
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provides fulfill a given set of standards. Accreditation is the status-granting 
process25. 
• Evaluation26 is the basis for such accreditation and gives a value estimation, and 
assesses the fulfilling of given standards. Evaluation includes internal assessment 
(self-evaluation), external review, the participation of students and publication of 
results.  
• Standards present agreed and prescribed measures and values that have to be 
attained by a person/institution/program. 
Given that all of these terms will be used in Serbian universities` legislation for the first 
(or almost the first) time, it is advisable that the Serbian lawmaker includes legal 
definitions of these notions in the future Act. 
Ad. 1. Concerning accreditation, the main question is who will be exposed to this 
course of action: 1. All universities and schools, independently of their founders and the 
date of founding, 2. All newly-founded institutions (a pro futuro procedure), independently 
of the founder’s person, 3. All private ones, 4. All newly-established, private ones. 
If one of the major accreditation goals has to be reduction of the Serbian higher 
education network through quality tests, in accordance with quality assurance and 
budget requirements, this goal may be reached, in the most effective manner, if one 
forces all institutions to undergo this check (option 1, above). On the other hand, if one 
wants to protect state universities from competition and to exclude them from the 
unforeseen negative legal consequences of any failures, these institutions can be 
completely excluded from accreditation testing (option 3, above). In my opinion, only the 
first solution is acceptable. 
Ad. 2. First of all, in making a priority list of evaluation models, Serbian lawmakers 
may be aware of the fact that self-evaluation should be given lesser weight compared 
with other methods of evaluation, since it is closely dependent on self-criticism (not a very 
widespread character trait). Accordingly, interior evaluation is not appropriate ground 
when it comes to final quality assessments. 
Secondly, students` evaluations of institutions and teaching staff are welcome. 
Nevertheless, as collaborators and participants in education, students will be biased. Yet 
their judgment still has to be taken into account to a great extent, though not decisively. 
                                            
25
 For the further definitions of accreditation procedures see: Commission for Higher Education 
Accreditation, Instructions and Criteria for Evaluation and Accreditation, Belgrade, 2004, p. 106. 
26
 See: Handal, Sudentş evaluation of teachins, Manual for teaching staff and students, Belgrade, 2003; 
Commission for Higher Education Accreditation, Instructions and Criteria for Evaluation and Accreditation, 
Belgrade, 2004 
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Finally, in our opinion, external evaluations, carried out by anonymous reviewers, are 
of a paramount value due to their impartiality. The attendance of foreign participants 
should secure comparative experiences - while the participation of domestic ones should 
ensure a local perspective. 
Ad. 3. Serbia is an inexperienced, small country - and it is unrealistic to expect it to 
come up with a perfect system of quality assurance standards. Because of this, it is more 
than obvious that it needs to accept every bit of assistance and support coming from 
outside. ENQA (the European Network of Quality Assurance Agencies) has a 
considerable role to play in defining and harmonizing evaluation standards, and it is an 
ally, too. ENQA have to develop an agreed set of standards, procedures and guidelines 
on quality assurance in the process of assisting countries higher education institutions 
and agencies to build up systems that can create mutual trust. Mutually accepted 
standards are able to provide the confidence that quality is being taken care of (A 
detailed set of norms might be used from the Norwegian Higher Education Act, see 
Chapter 3). 
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